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Abstract  
 
We analyse the electoral consequences of the Great Recession by combining insights from 
economic voting theories, and the literature on party system change. Taking our cues from these 
two theoretical perspectives, we assess the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and 
change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems. We start from the premise that, 
to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused 
on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long-term party system change 
provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original 
dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. 
The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable 
losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilization of Western European party 
systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, 
where political rather than economic failure appeared to be more relevant. In line with the 
realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe radical populist right, 
radical left, and non-mainstream parties benefited the most form the economic hardship, while 
the support for mainstream parties decreased further.  
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INTRODUCTION  
In this paper, we analyse the electoral consequences of the Great Recession in Europe from two 
theoretical perspectives: economic voting and party system change. The vast literature on 
economic voting suggests that voters react to this kind of crisis by punishing the incumbents and 
by voting in favour of the opposition. Economic voting occurs in ‘normal’ times, and we may 
expect it to occur to an even greater extent under the impact of the contemporary economic 
crisis. The worldview of this perspective is essentially a short-term and cyclical one: voters 
follow the business cycle and reward or punish incumbents according to the economic situation. 
The alternative perspective is that of the development and change of party systems. Contrary to 
the economic voting literature, the equally vast literature on this perspective takes a long-term 
view on voting patterns and expects them to move as a result of long-term shifts in the structure 
of social conflicts. As old social conflicts lose in importance and new conflicts emerge from the 
fundamental transformation of society, the pattern of political conflict is changing as well. As 
new political actors emerge and old political actors adapt to the changing conflict structure, the 
pattern of voting gets destabilized, giving rise to processes of dealignment/realignment in the 
party system. Applying these two perspectives to the analysis of the electoral consequences of 
the Great Recession allows us to provide a comprehensive assessment of the voters’ reactions to 
this deep economic crisis and its impact on European party systems.  
 We argue that the joint consideration of these two theoretical perspectives provides new 
insights into the political consequences of the Great Recession in Europe. While in normal times 
economic voting theories may provide an adequate account of the impact of the economy on 
electoral politics, in extraordinary times, the long-term perspective of party system change needs 
to be incorporated into the analysis. Applied to a critical moment like the Great Recession, the 
economic voting perspective only tells a partial story about the impact of the economy on voting.  
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In contexts like the Great Recession, punishment of the incumbents by the voters is not only 
likely to occur in much greater proportions, but its consequences are also likely to be longer-
lasting than the shifts of the voters to the mainstream opposition parties. In contrast to normal 
times, during the crisis, the predicted extraordinary punishment of incumbents’ parties is 
expected to contribute to the destabilization of European party systems (i.e. increase their 
volatility) and, as a consequence, to accelerate pre-existing processes of party system change. 
Hence, in terms of the perspective of party systems’ theory, the Great Recession may constitute a 
‘critical juncture’, which is not only likely to erode the support of incumbent parties, but of all 
the mainstream parties. By giving rise to extraordinary punishments of all the mainstream 
parties, the economic crisis may accelerate pre-existing de-/realignment processes. 
The economic voting perspective constitutes the starting point for our analysis of the 
consequences of the Great Recession.  Building on this perspective and combining it with the 
perspective of party system change allows us to formulate more detailed expectations about the 
specific type of parties that are likely to lose and gain support during the Great Recession. 
Incorporating the predictions of economic voting theory into the broader and more general 
expectations that can be derived from party systems change theories will  provide us with a more 
complete account of the electoral consequences of the Great Recession.    
 Our empirical analyses draw on a database of electoral outcomes at the aggregate level, 
complemented with political and economic indicators, for 27 EU-member states, plus Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland1. Our dataset includes data on electoral returns for all relevant parties in 
these countries in the two elections preceding the outbreak of the economic crisis and of all the 
elections that have taken place since then up to summer 2014. We start out by presenting some 
                                                          
1 Given its late accession to the EU Croatia is excluded.  
 
 
 
4 
considerations of the two theoretical perspectives with respect to the electoral consequences of 
the Great Recession. Next, we present our data. Then, we move on to the presentation of the 
results and we conclude by a summary discussion.  
 
THEORY 
The literature on economic voting provides us with a baseline model for how the crisis has 
played out in electoral terms. This literature is based on the assumption of instrumentally rational 
voters, who reward the incumbents with their vote, when the economy is good, and punish them 
when the economy is bad. According to this literature, it is not the personal financial situation, 
which is decisive for the economic vote, but the perception of the national economy (Duch and 
Stevenson 2008, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Empirical studies on economic voting 
document that it is both pervasive and variable, depending on the context. According to Duch 
and Stevenson’s (2008: 65) overall estimates the median economic vote magnitude is about 5 
percent. By comparison, Powell and Whitten (1993: 410) estimated the typical cost of governing 
at the aggregate level at just 2 per cent. These results were obtained by analysing a large number 
of ‘normal’ elections. There is now also a growing literature on economic voting in the Great 
Recession, which shows that the electoral punishment of the incumbents has been massive and 
that it is a function of the depth of the recession (Bartels 2014, Kriesi 2014). In line with this 
literature, we expect that, in a period of economic turmoil, economic considerations are likely to 
be more salient for the decision of rewarding or punishing the incumbent. During this period, 
citizens should be more likely to judge the incumbent as a function of the decline in economic 
performance than in normal times. 
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 The economic voting literature suggests that the size of the electoral punishment for 
economic performance is conditioned by the political context. More specifically, it suggests that 
it is less the objective economic conditions than the perception of government responsibility for 
the economic conditions that is of crucial importance for economic voting. Thus, Powell and 
Whitten’s (1993) documented that the clarity of political responsibility conditions economic 
voting: the voters’ assessment of the government’s economic performance only plays a role, if 
the institutional context allows them to clearly attribute the responsibility for the economic 
performance to the government. In addition, perceived constraints of the government’s 
manoeuvring space also influence the extent to which incumbents are punished. Hellwig and 
Samuels (2007) show that voters in more open economies are less likely to evaluate incumbents 
on the basis of fluctuations in economic growth. In the context of the Great Recession, the 
attribution of responsibility to the EU has led to lower levels of national economic voting in 
Southern Europe (Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). Similarly, Clarke and Whitten (2013) attributed 
the limited impact of economic voting in the 2009 German elections to ‘countervailing factors’ – 
a lack of clarity of responsibility in the German polity and the availability of alternative actors to 
be blamed.  
 Given that perceptions are crucial for the punishment of incumbents, we would like to 
point out three implications which seem to us of major importance in the context of the Great 
Recession. First, we follow Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012), who argue that it is not so much the 
size of the economic decline that is decisive for the electoral punishment, but the dramatic 
manner in which the crisis developed. In accounting for the extraordinary severity of Fianna 
Fáil’s losses in the 2011 Irish elections, Marsh and Mikhaylov attribute key importance to two 
events that have focused the minds of the Irish voters – the bank guarantee in Fall 2008, and the 
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Irish withdrawal from the bond market in Fall 2010. In a similar vein, Beissinger and Sasse 
(2014) point to IMF-interventions as critical conditions for austerity protests in Central- and 
Eastern Europe. In the Irish case, the second moment preceded the ECB/IMF intervention by a 
few days, but we would still argue that such an intervention was already looming large and, in 
any case, it may serve as an indicator for critical moments in the unfolding of the Great 
Recession in the countries particularly hard hit by the economic crisis. 
 Second, we would like to point out that the severity of the economic crisis is likely to be 
perceived differently as a function of past experience with economic crises. Building on relative 
deprivation theory (Gurr 1970), we expect the relative decline in performance to be decisive for 
the electoral consequences – relative in temporal terms within one country as well as in terms of 
cross-national comparisons. Relative deprivation theory is based on the idea that citizens’ 
grievances and behaviours are a function of the perceived discrepancy between their expectations 
about the conditions of life to which they believe to be entitled to, and the realization of these 
expectations. People’s expectations with respect to the economy, in turn, are likely to be 
influenced by the past economic performance of their own country – their country’s past 
performance in absolute terms and in terms relative to other, comparable countries. Without any 
reference to this theory, Coffey (2013) has recently introduced the closely related notion of ‘pain 
tolerance’ to explain the economic voting of Czech citizens. She showed that the punishment of 
incumbents is a function of the departure of economic indicators from the long-term average, i.e. 
relative to the country’s past economic performance. In other words, poor past performance 
increases the voters’ tolerance with respect to poor current performance and vice versa for good 
past performance. In line with this finding, we expect the citizens of Central- and East European 
(CEE) countries in general to have greater tolerance with respect to poor economic performance 
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than citizens of West European (WE) countries. When the Great Recession hit the populations of 
the CEE countries already had a lot of experience with economic hardship as a result of the 
difficulties encountered in the course of their transition to market economies. For example, the 
Baltic countries that were hit by massive unemployment increases already had a lot of experience 
with high levels of unemployment. By contrast, WE citizens, especially in Greece, Spain or 
Ireland, had experienced economic growth accompanied by a sharp decline in unemployment 
rates in the decades prior to the crisis, a trend which they probably expected to continue, and 
which made the equally sharp increases of unemployment during the crisis particularly galling 
for them.   
 Third, and in a similar vein, we expect the impact of economic decline on the incumbent 
vote to be less severe in the first post-crisis election than in subsequent post-crisis elections. In 
the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, most European countries suffered an 
economic setback, which means that, in cross-national comparative terms, all incumbents 
performed badly. As time progressed, however, the economic prospects of most, but not all of 
the European countries improved. The voters of the countries where the economy continued to 
stagnate or even experienced a pronounced double-dip recession, among other things as a result 
of the austerity measures that really started to have an impact on the respective economies, are 
likely to have perceived the incumbents’ failure as particularly serious – not only compared to 
the other countries, but also compared to the past, pre-crisis record.  
This discussion can be summarized in four hypotheses: the punishment of the incumbents 
in the Great Recession should be greater … 
H1: …in hard hit countries (‘severity of the crisis’ hypothesis) 
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H2: …in countries which experienced comparatively little economic hardship in the recent 
past (i.e. WE countries) (‘past experience’ hypothesis) 
H3: …in countries with dramatic unfolding of key events (involving ECB/IMF 
intervention) (‘dramatic events’ hypothesis) 
H4: … and, especially, in second post-crisis elections (‘timing’ hypothesis) 
 
In the economic voting literature, the political context conditions are typically thought to 
have a short-term impact on the voting choice. This literature does not take into account long-
term trends in the development of party systems. This is a serious shortcoming when it comes to 
the analysis of a major economic crisis. In contrast to ‘normal times’, when the focus on cyclical 
effects and incumbent governments seems justified, the intervention of a major crisis may 
accentuate long-term trends of party system change, and it may even lead to a substantial 
modification of the structure and equilibrium of the party system in a given country.  
As is well known from the literature on the political consequences of economic crises in 
Latin America (Morgan 2012, Seawright 2012, Roberts 2013), such crises may lead to party 
brand dilution, to a decline of partisanship and, eventually, to a process of dealignment in the 
party system. Hence, while the economic voting perspective provides a baseline for the analysis 
of the effects of the crisis, it needs to be complemented with an approach that allows us to take 
into account its potential effects on the party system as a whole and the pre-existing long-term 
trends of party system change. As we indicated above, during the Great Recession the 
punishment of incumbents as a consequence of the declining economic performance is likely to 
be substantial. This provides the first condition for the destabilization and change of party 
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systems as a result of the economic crisis.  In normal times voters are likely to turn to 
mainstream opposition parties, but under extraordinary circumstances voters may lose 
confidence in all the parties that have habitually governed. This is expected to occur especially if 
the crisis drags on and successive governments of different mainstream composition prove to be 
incapable of improving the economic situation. Under such conditions, voters may be more 
likely to move beyond mainstream opposition parties altogether and opt for parties not so closely 
associated with the current economic and political system. The cumulated punishment of 
mainstream parties may accelerate and/or reshape pre-existing de-/realignment processes in the 
party system, and as a consequence produce further increases in party system volatility.  
 From such a long-term perspective, it is important to note that the observers of West 
European party systems have identified profound long-term trends that, at the time of the onset 
of the Great Recession, have been going on for several decades. Essentially, there are three 
interpretations of these trends in the literature: the realignment, the dealignment, and the cartel 
party detachment perspectives (Kitschelt and Rehm 2015). The third perspective, which is a 
radical version of the second one, proposes that parties in Western Europe are losing their 
structural roots in society, their coherence and their representative function (Mair, 2013). 
Indicators of this long-term trend are declining voter turnout, declining party identification, 
decreasing party membership as well as increasing electoral volatility. Dealignment scholars 
have long pointed to the mainstream parties’ declining embeddedness in social divisions of 
religion and class, and the increasing importance of issue-voting (see Franklin et al. 1992). This 
line of argument suggests that the increasing economic voting in times of a deep economic crisis 
is nothing but an intensification of a longer term trend of destabilization of European party 
systems. 
 
 
 
10 
 The realignment perspective does not contradict the dealignment scholars with regard to 
the overall destabilizing trends. However, it adds countervailing trends which eventually lead to 
a stable reconfiguration of the party systems: in the long run, strategic parties realign with 
changing preference distributions among voters, which are related to social structural 
transformations (Kitschelt/Rehm 2015, Häusermann/Kriesi 2015, Kriesi et al. 2006). Voters 
gravitate to parties with programmatic appeals congruent with their preferences. More speci-
fically, a new cleavage opposes the low-skilled, nationalistic ‘losers of globalization’, who are 
mainly mobilized by parties of the populist radical right, to the high-skilled, cosmopolitan 
winners of globalization, who are mainly mobilized by Green, liberal and centre-left parties. In 
other words, this perspective adds more specific expectations about the party families that might 
be gaining ground in the Great Recession, which complement the main expectation of the 
economic voting perspective with regards to the lower support of incumbent parties. Since it is 
above all the ‘globalization losers’ who have been affected by the economic downturn, we can 
expect the parties that mobilize these groups of the population to benefit from the punishment of 
the incumbents, especially in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. Among the parties mobilizing 
such losers we find above all parties of the populist radical right, parties of the radical left (which 
have always mobilized the disadvantaged in class terms), and new parties more generally.  
 From the party systems perspective, CEE countries differ profoundly from those in WE, 
with far-reaching implications for the potential impact of the Great Recession. While the 
mainstream parties of WE party systems no longer seem to have the means to adequately 
represent their traditional constituencies, the CEE party systems have not yet produced 
mainstream parties that adequately represent them. When measured against different criteria of 
institutionalization CEE party systems appear to still be less institutionalized (Casal Bértoa 
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2014). The most important empirical evidence for the lack of institutionalization of these party 
systems comes from Neff Powell and Tucker (2013), who show that the very high level of 
volatility in these systems since the democratic transition has above all been due to the entry and 
exit of parties.  
 The high volatility of CEE party systems is linked to the widespread dissatisfaction of the 
CEE publics with their political elites which predates the intervention of the economic crisis. The 
low level of political and administrative performance and the corresponding high level of 
corruption in these countries have contributed to the constitution of anti-elitist sentiments, which 
provided a general breeding ground for populist challengers, even before the economic crisis 
intervened (Pop-Eleches 2010: 232). In times of economic crisis, however, the tolerance for 
corruption that tends to have benefited from the previously good economic performances in these 
countries is likely to have diminished considerably (see Klasnja and Tucker 2013). In other 
words, in CEE countries, the Great Recession can be expected to have given rise to a 
combination of a political and an economic crisis. As a result of this particular combination of 
circumstances, the mobilization by new challengers in the party system has taken on particular 
characteristics in CEE. Ucen (2007: 54) has referred to the rise of a new ‚centrist populism‘, and 
Deegan-Krause (2007: 152) called them a purely anti-elite populism ‘focusing entirely on the 
need for ‘new faces in government’ as part of a major fight against corruption’. The tough anti-
establishment appeal of these new populist challengers has been directed against all previous 
configurations of the ruling elite.  
This discussion of the long-term trends in the party systems can be summarized in the 
following three hypotheses:  
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H5: The Great Recession increasingly destabilizes the party systems in WE, whereas it has 
much less of a destabilizing effect on the party system in CEE (‘destabilization’ 
hypothesis) 
H6: The changing levels of corruption are contributing to the punishment of the 
incumbents and to the destabilization of the party systems in CEE, but not in WE 
(‘corruption’ hypothesis) 
H7: New parties, parties of the populist radical right and the radical left, as well as other 
non-mainstream parties, benefit from the crisis by receiving greater support in those WE 
countries most affected by the crisis (‘deep crisis’ hypothesis) 
 
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION  
Our empirical analyses rely on a database of electoral outcomes, which includes data on electoral 
returns for all relevant parties in 30 European countries in the two national legislative elections 
preceding the outbreak of the Great Recession and of all national legislative elections that have 
taken place since then, up to and including the Slovenian elections in July 2014. We define as 
post-crisis elections all the national elections that took place after November 2008. Overall we 
cover 107 elections: 61 pre-crisis (two per country2) and 46 post-crisis, 30 of which are the first 
post-crisis election that took place in a given country, and 16 correspond to the second post-crisis 
election.  
                                                          
2 Austria had an election in September 2008. We consider this election as pre-crisis, and we include 3 pre-crisis 
elections for Austria.  
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 To test our hypotheses we rely on four dependent variables3.  First we analyse the role of 
the economic conditions by assessing their impact on the change in the vote share for the prime 
minister’s party between a given election at time t and t+1. Second, we analyse the electoral 
returns for the prime minister party at time t+1 as a function of the votes it received in the 
previous election at time t. To characterize the overall effect of the crisis on the stability and 
change of party systems as a whole we rely, third, on electoral volatility measures, and, fourth, 
on the change in the support for individual parties between a given election at time t and t+1. For 
the analysis of electoral volatility, we adopt the distinction between type-A volatility (volatility 
caused by the entry and exit of parties from the political system) and type-B volatility (volatility 
generated by vote switching between existing parties) (Neff Powell and Tucker 2013) 
 To measure the change in economic conditions in a given country, we rely on three 
economic indicators: change in GDP, change in the unemployment rate and change in 
government debt between the election at time t and t+1. Given the expectation that citizens 
should be more likely to respond to general economic trends and not to the evolution of specific 
macroeconomic indicators we have combined these three indicators to create a summary measure 
of a country’s economic misery. An exploratory factor analysis on these three items yields a one-
factor solution, with all items loading strongly on one single dimension.4. Based on the factor 
scores we estimate our misery indicator, which takes higher values for worsening economic 
conditions. To measure the relative decline in performance across countries we compute an 
additional variable (“cross-country relative misery”) that indicates the degree to which the 
change in misery in a given country deviates from the pre or post-crisis average change in misery 
in WE and CEE countries respectively. To compute this variable the misery indicator of each 
                                                          
3 See appendix B for details about variables’ operationalization 
4 See Table A1 in appendix A.  
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country-election observation is divided by the average misery of its corresponding geographical 
location (WE or CEE) in the corresponding time period (pre-crisis or post-crisis). Hence, higher 
values indicate a relatively higher increase in misery. In order to test our third hypothesis we rely 
on a variable that captures whether a given country was part of an IMF program that implied 
policy conditionality.  
 To characterize the political context, we compute a variable that reflects the change in 
corruption between the election at time t and t+1 based on the Corruption Perception Index, with 
higher values indicating an increase in corruption. We also introduce a dummy variable 
distinguishing between single-party governments and coalition governments to control for 
‘clarity of responsibility’.  In order to control for the permissiveness of the electoral system, in 
the volatility models we control for the average district magnitude of each country. Following, 
Powell and Whitten (1993) we also introduce a variable that accounts for the short-term 
fluctuations in the government party’s gains and losses in the previous elections (swing). Given 
the special character of Switzerland’s ‘prime minister’ we also include a Switzerland dummy. 
 To test the hypotheses related to gains and losses of different types of parties in WE we 
classify parties in five mutually exclusive categories: new, radical left, populist radical right, 
non-mainstream, and mainstream parties.5 Parties that participate for the first time in a given 
election are included in the ‘new’ group irrespective of their ideology. In later elections they are 
included in their respective category. The radical left and populist radical right are defined based 
on their ideology. The rest of the parties are classified as either mainstream or non-mainstream. 
The mainstream parties encompass those parties that have played a key role in a country’s party 
                                                          
5 Only parties with parliamentary representation and receiving at least three percent of the vote share are included in 
the dataset.   
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system since the post-war period, and cannot be classified among radical left or populist radical 
right parties. All the remaining parties are classified as non-mainstream. In total our sample 
includes 480 party-election observations: 203 mainstream, 165 non-mainstream, 52 radical left, 
40 populist radical right, and 20 new parties6.  
 
RESULTS 
Following the economic voting model we start our analyses by assessing the effects of the 
economic context on the performance of the prime minister’s party7. Given their different 
patterns of party competition and economic trends, in all the empirical analyses we distinguish 
between WE and CEE. Table 1 presents the results with respect to economic voting. The 
baseline Model 1 assesses the effect of changes in misery on the performance of the prime 
minister’s party between two elections. As predicted by the economic voting approach, an 
increase in misery is associated with a worsening performance of the incumbent party at the next 
election. This effect is stronger in WE countries. 
<Table 1> 
 Model 2 tests whether, during the Great Recession, the punishment of the incumbents has 
been greater in hard hit countries (‘severity of the crisis’ hypothesis) and whether the punishment 
has become greater as the crisis progressed (`timing’ hypothesis). In the case of WE both 
hypotheses are confirmed. During the economic crisis incumbent parties have been more 
                                                          
6 Each election in which a party is present is treated as an independent observation of that party. Our WE sample 
includes a total of 135 parties. See appendix C.  
7  We replicated the analyses that rely on the vote share of the prime minister’s party specifying as the dependent 
variable the vote share of all parties that form the cabinet. Our conclusions are not altered by this change in the 
specification of the dependent variable (results available upon request).  
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severely punished as the economic conditions of their countries worsened while they were in 
office. Moreover, citizens seem to have perceived worsening economic conditions as a greater 
failure of the incumbent party as the crisis progressed, since a one unit increase in misery is 
associated with a greater punishment of the incumbent party in the second post-crisis election. 
Governments elected after the outbreak of the Great Recession which failed to redress the 
economic situation of their countries were more severely punished than governments that 
happened to be in office in hard hit countries when the Great Recession began. By contrast, in 
CEE there are no statistically significant differences between the pre and post-crisis periods, and 
some of the coefficients suggest that misery may even have had a more limited impact on the 
performance of incumbent parties during the post-crisis period. To further assess the differences 
between CEE and WE we pool our data and specify a three-way interaction between the misery 
indicator, the timing of the election, and the region8. Figure 1 summarizes these results and 
confirms that during the crisis there is a closer relationship between economic performance and 
incumbents’ support in WE. Although none of the coefficients is statistically significant, the 
three-way interaction coefficients are correctly signed, indicating a lower importance of the 
economic conditions during the crisis in CEE. 
<Figure 1>  
 To probe further into the importance of the relative decline in economic performance, we 
introduce in our models a variable capturing the relative decline in performance across countries 
(cross-country relative misery). Model 3 reveals that increasing cross-national relative misery 
significantly reduced the vote share of incumbents in WE, but not in CEE. At the same time, 
model 4 confirms that the negative effect of the relative decline in performance was significantly 
                                                          
8 See model 1 in table A2 in appendix A.  
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stronger during the Great Recession, and this negative effect strengthened further as the crisis 
progressed. These results confirm again the differences between WE and CEE, since all the 
relevant coefficients are substantially smaller for CEE countries. The differences between WE 
and CEE also show up in the explanatory power of all of our economic models. Models for WE 
explain around 40 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. By contrast, in CEE the 
models only account for a maximum of 20 percent of the variance. In sum, these results clearly 
confirm the ‘severity of the crisis’ and ‘timing’ hypotheses for WE, and they also support our 
fourth hypothesis about the differences between WE and CEE due to their past experience with 
economic crises.  
 Moving to the specific analysis of the impact of IMF interventions, model 5 assesses 
whether incumbents have lost support if their countries were part of an IMF program that 
implied policy conditionality. Results are clear, when compared to incumbents from other WE 
countries, and independently of the economic performance of their country, incumbents from 
countries where the IMF intervened could expect to lose as much as 10.8 percent of their 
support.  Hence, in WE governments were heavily punished if they had to resort to the IMF to 
redress the economic situation of their countries.  By contrast, in CEE the incumbents’ loss of 
votes associated with an IMF intervention amounts to only 5.5 percent of their vote share.  
 In order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the electoral consequences of the 
Great Recession, we turn to the analysis of the stability and change of European party systems. 
The extraordinary punishment of incumbents during the Great Recession, predicted by the 
economic voting approach and confirmed by our empirical analyses, provides the first condition 
for the destabilization of the party systems of the countries most affected by the economic crisis. 
As outlined in the theory section, we expect this extraordinary punishment to be the catalyst of 
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the acceleration of the long-term trends identified by the re/dealignment perspectives. In order to 
bridge the approaches of economic voting and party system change we first analyse the effect of 
the economic crisis on the stability and predictability of the support for the main actors in 
economic voting theories: the incumbents. We assess how the vote for the incumbents at time t 
predicts the incumbents’ vote share at time t+1, in the pre and post-crisis period. If this 
relationship becomes weaker in the post-crisis period, we have a first indication that party 
systems are becoming less stable during the crisis. Table 2 presents the results for this first test. 
<Table 2> 
Three important results are conveyed by model 1. First, for pre-crisis elections, the results 
confirm the expected key difference between WE and CEE party systems: in pre-crisis elections 
the previous vote share is a better predictor of the subsequent vote share in WE than in CEE 
(‘percent vote time t’ coefficient). This result indicates that sizable fluctuations in the electoral 
support of incumbent parties were uncommon in WE before the crisis. Second, during the Great 
Recession WE, but not CEE party systems became less stable in terms of the predictability of 
incumbent support. Figure 2 graphs this changing relationship. In WE, the close relationship 
between the incumbent’s vote share at times t and t+1 became weaker as the crisis progressed. 
The contrary seems to be the case in CEE countries. As the economic crisis advanced in CEE, 
the predictability of incumbent’s vote share increased, although in this region the differences are 
not statistically significant. These results provide a first indication that the crisis may have 
affected the party systems of WE and CEE in different ways.9 Third, model 1 also includes a 
                                                          
9 To test whether the differences between the two groups of countries are significant we pool our data and specify a 
three-way interaction of the incumbent’s vote at time t, the timing of the election, and the region. The results 
confirm that the economic crisis has weakened the relationship between the previous and subsequent share of votes 
in WE, and it has strengthened this relationship in CEE countries. See table A.3 in appendix A.  
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variable measuring change in corruption levels. The results reveal that while change in 
corruption levels is a relevant predictor of incumbent performance in CEE, this is not the case in 
WE.10 In line with the ‘corruption hypothesis’, corruption is only associated with a substantial 
reduction in the vote share of incumbent parties in CEE countries.   
<Figure 2> 
We probe further into the overall effect of the crisis on the stability of the party systems 
by analysing the volatility of the elections covered. This is the most adequate indicator of the 
effects of the crisis on party systems, since it takes into account the electoral outcome of all 
parties. Table 3 presents a comparison of electoral volatility in the pre and post-crisis periods11. 
Although the total level of volatility is higher in CEE for both time periods, total volatility has 
increased substantially in WE during the Great Recession, while this has not been the case in 
CEE, even if the levels of misery have increased to a similar extent in both regions. In fact, type-
B volatility, which refers to vote switching between existing parties, has only increased in WE. 
Moreover, in the course of the crisis, type-A volatility, which measures volatility caused by the 
entry and exit of new parties, has generally increased in both parts of Europe, but it increased 
more substantially in WE. In WE the relative increase in type-A volatility is higher than the 
relative increase in type-B volatility, which is a clear sign of the acceleration of the erosion of the 
party system in the West during the economic crisis. Comparing the levels of post-crisis total 
volatility to the ones calculated by Bartolini and Mair (1990) for the period 1885-1985, it appears 
that the majority of WE party systems are not undergoing ‘normal’ times. In the post-crisis 
                                                          
10 The difference in the impact of corruption between WE and CEE is also confirmed by an interaction between the 
corruption and the region indicators in our pooled dataset. See model 1 table A.3 in appendix A.  
11 The 2012 Romanian elections are not included in the volatility analyses because they pose a problem for the 
coding of new parties.  
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period, mean aggregate volatility (14.9) is almost twice as high as the one for the period 1885-
1985 (8.2), and it is even higher than the volatility of turbulent times like the interwar period.    
<Table 3> 
 To analyse the role that fluctuations in the support of incumbent parties play for these 
changes in the levels of electoral volatility, Table 3 also provides the explained variance (R2) in 
the levels of total volatility by the changes in support of PM parties12. In the case of WE there are 
clear differences between the pre and post-crisis periods. While before the crisis changes in 
support of PM parties did not explain much of the variance in electoral volatility, in the post-
crisis period they accounted for more than half of the corresponding variance. In CEE, where 
volatility levels were always higher, the differences in the variance explained between the pre 
and post-crisis periods are more limited. However, it is worth noting that in both periods change 
in support of the PM party appears to explain a substantial portion of the volatility variance. 
Hence, at least in the case of WE, these results support the idea that the central actors in the 
economic voting models (the incumbent parties) also play a crucial role for the stability and 
change of party systems during periods of deep economic crisis. Without the large changes in 
support of incumbent parties as a result of the worsening economic conditions it would have 
been unlikely that the party systems of WE countries would have reached these high levels of 
instability in a such a short period of time.  
An analysis of the determinants of electoral volatility in WE and CEE provides a formal 
test of the ‘destabilization’ and ‘corruption’ hypotheses. Figure 3 summarizes the results of this 
analysis for both type-A and type-B volatility. It becomes apparent that in WE economic 
                                                          
12 The model has been estimated using OLS with the total volatility measure as the dependent variable and the 
change in the share of votes for the PM as the independent variable.  
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performance is an important determinant of both type-A and type-B volatility. As the economy 
worsens both types of volatility increase in WE. In CEE, however, levels of volatility appear to 
be unrelated to economic performance. In contrast, changes in the levels of corruption are 
associated with increases in type-B volatility in CEE but not in WE countries. The effect of 
corruption on type-A volatility is not statistically significant in any of the regions. As expected, 
economic performance increases volatility only in WE, and corruption is associated with higher 
volatility levels only in CEE13. Overall, these results provide further support for the 
‘destabilization’ and ‘corruption’ hypotheses, and explain why volatility has increased in WE as 
a result of the Great Recession, while that has not been the case in CEE.   
<Figure 3> 
Having established that WE party systems became more unstable during the economic 
crisis and that the punishment of incumbent parties has been a relevant factor for this increasing 
instability, we now turn to an analysis of whether certain types of parties benefited from the 
party system instability brought about by the economic crisis. We restrict our analyses to WE 
because the crisis does not appear to have had a substantial impact on the stability of CEE party 
systems. To assess the gains and losses of the different types of parties we analyse the impact of 
the economic crisis on the change in the vote share from time t to t+1 of the different types of 
parties. To assess whether the recession has accelerated pre-existing long-term trends of party 
system change, our main interest is to compare the performance of the different types of parties 
against the performance of mainstream parties. This is why we use mainstream parties as our 
reference category in the next models.   
                                                          
13 To further assess these differences we pool our data and regress the summary measure of total volatility on the 
interactions of misery and region, and corruption and region. Model 3 Table A4 (appendix A) summarizes the 
results, which confirm that there are significant differences in the relationship between misery, corruption and 
volatility between WE and CEE countries. 
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<Table 4> 
The results of model 1 in Table 4 confirm that, independently of the economic conditions, 
ruling is costly for incumbents. Parties that are part of government coalitions are expected to 
receive 3.6 percent less votes in the next election, and an extra 1.5 percent loss is added to the 
prime minister party. Model 2 examines the effects of economic conditions for different types of 
parties. The results reveal that in comparison to mainstream parties all the other party types 
generally make significant gains as the economy worsens. The populist radical right and new 
parties are the ones who benefit the most from the increases in misery. It is important to note that 
these and subsequent results hold under control for incumbent status, which suggests that 
mainstream opposition parties are not generally among the beneficiaries of the incumbents’ 
losses. On the contrary, controlling for incumbency (prime minister and government status) 
increases in misery are associated with a lower vote share for mainstream parties (whether in 
government or in opposition), as indicated by the significant negative effect of the misery 
coefficient in model 2.   
 Moving now to the specific impact of the Great Recession, model 3 assesses whether the 
fact that a country required IMF assistance had consequences for the support of the different 
types of parties. The results reveal that IMF interventions implied an average loss of 4 percent of 
their votes for mainstream parties (direct effect of IMF-intervention), while all the other types of 
parties appear to have benefited from IMF interventions. Again, the parties that made the most 
significant gains were non-mainstream, radical right, and new parties. By definition new parties 
always increase their vote share. However, in countries with IMF interventions, the gains of new 
parties, with respect to mainstream parties, were twice as important as in countries that were not 
part of an IMF program.  
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 Finally, model 4 compares the effect of economic performance before and after the onset 
of the Great Recession. The purpose of this model is to test whether non-mainstream, peripheral 
(radical left and right) and new parties have always benefited from increases in misery, or 
whether this has only been the case during turbulent times. Figure 5 summarizes the results of 
this model. The differences between the two periods are unambiguous. Before the economic 
crisis, the economic situation had no apparent effect on the support of different types of parties, 
with the exception of radical right and new parties. The former received less, the latter more 
votes as the economy worsened, but none of the effects is statistically significant during the pre-
crisis period.14 However, after the onset of the Great Recession the picture changed. First, 
mainstream parties started receiving fewer votes as the crisis became more severe, independently 
of their incumbent status. In fact, the average support for mainstream parties fell from 25 percent 
in the last pre-crisis election to 21 percent during the crisis period. Second, both non-mainstream 
and peripheral parties significantly benefited from the worsening economic conditions during the 
Great Recession. In this period, citizens of countries that suffered worsening economic 
conditions were more likely to defect from mainstream parties and to opt for either non-
mainstream or peripheral parties. These results provide support for the ‘deep crisis’ hypothesis, 
with regard to radical left and populist right parties as well as non-mainstream parties. It is in the 
countries most affected by the economic crisis, in terms of misery increase and IMF intervention, 
that we can find growing support for this kind of parties. Surprisingly, though, even if our 
aggregate data supports the idea that both the number and share of votes of new parties increased 
                                                          
14 For the pre-crisis period none of the slopes in Figure 5 is statistically significant. For the post-crisis period the 
slopes of non-mainstream, radical left and radical right parties are positive and statistically significant at least at 
p<0.1. For mainstream parties the slope is negative and statistically significant at p<0.01. The effects are not 
statistically significant for new parties in any of the periods. Marginal effects for model 4 interactions are 
summarized in Table A5 appendix A.  
 
 
 
24 
during the crisis (results not shown), model 5 suggests that during this period the gains of new 
parties were not more closely related to economic performance. 
<Figure 5>  
Conclusion  
Our analyses by and large confirm the economic voting model, which we have used as a baseline 
for our analysis. In the Great Recession, incumbents have been heavily punished, especially in 
the hardest hit countries of WE. Electoral punishment of poor economic performance has 
generally been more limited in CEE, where populations have been more accustomed to economic 
hardship than in WE. If dramatic events like IMF interventions have increased punishment 
across Europe, their impact was especially severe in WE. Moreover, if the crisis dragged on, 
electoral punishment has been stepped up in WE, but not in CEE. Adopting a broader and more 
general perspective that shifts the focus from incumbent parties to the entire party system, we 
have been able to show, however, that, in WE, the cumulated effect of the Great Recession, goes 
far beyond the short-term punishment of incumbents. Thus, the predictability of the incumbents’ 
vote share decreased substantially in the course of the Great Recession, while the overall 
volatility of the entire party system increased, but the other mainstream parties which habitually 
govern hardly benefited from the predicament of the incumbents. As expected by the party 
systems perspective, the main beneficiaries of the crisis and the increasing electoral volatility 
have been parties of the populist radical right and the radical left, as well as new parties. Radical 
parties benefited especially in the hardest hit countries, while the vote share of new parties has 
been rising independently of economic hardship in post-crisis elections across WE. Taken 
together, these results suggest that the long-term trend towards a destabilization of the WE party 
systems has been accelerated during the Great Recession.  
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 By contrast, the impact of the Great Recession on the party systems of CEE has been 
quite different. In these countries, incumbents have been punished less for economic hardship 
than for increasing corruption. Overall, the party systems of this region have followed an 
opposite trend to the one observed in WE. While the volatility of the CEE party systems is still 
higher than in WE, it is noteworthy that the volatility between established parties has actually 
decreased in the post-crisis period in CEE countries. Taking a long-term view, Lane and Ersson 
(1996: 130) suggested that, in terms of volatility, fractionalization, and polarization, the party 
systems of the two parts of Europe might have more in common than things that set them apart. 
While it is still premature to speak of convergence of the party systems in the two parts of 
Europe, the contrasting experience of WE and CEE party systems during the Great Recession 
suggests that the long-term trend may bring them closer together (see also Casal Bértoa 2014).  
 As we have pointed out in our theoretical discussion, all three interpretations of the long-
term developments of WE party systems agree on the destabilizing trends. Where the 
realignment perspective differs from the other two is that it does not only identify destabilizing 
factors, but also points to countervailing trends that are expected to eventually lead to party 
system restructuration. The fact that the parties of the radical left and right as well as other non-
mainstream parties (a category that includes above all Green parties) have been benefiting the 
most from the economic hardship suggests that the Great Recession has (so far) served as a 
catalyst for the acceleration of long-term trends that have been restructuring WE party systems 
for more than three decades by now.  
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Table 1. Economic conditions and the performance of PM (Y = % votes t+1 - % votes t)  
  WE   CEE 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Misery -4.662*** -1.642   -2.764** 
 
-2.956 -2.579   -3.605 
 
(-5.006) (-0.942)   (-2.528) 
 
(-1.289) (-0.721)   (-1.523) 
Cross-country relative misery 
  
-12.78*** -3.911  
   
-6.359 -4.835  
   
(-4.488) (-0.942)  
   
(-1.188) (-0.721)  
Election timing. Ref (pre-crisis) 
  
   
   
   
      First post-crisis -0.576 -0.687 -5.229*** 9.645 -1.592 
 
0.836 0.909 -2.435 4.829 3.133 
 
(-0.294) (-0.341) (-3.033) (1.503) (-0.845) 
 
(0.159) (0.159) (-0.521) (0.388)      (0.554) 
      Second post-crisis -2.913 -2.891 -7.238*** 10.16 -0.207 
 
-1.037 -3.370 -4.563 -12.23 1.649 
 
(-1.181) (-1.139) (-2.945) (1.321) (-0.0824) 
 
(-0.169) (-0.409) (-0.846) (-0.337) (0.249) 
Coalition government -1.775 -1.461 -1.907 -1.461 -1.881 
 
1.399 2.213 1.500 2.213    1.074 
 
(-1.064) (-0.888) (-1.111) (-0.888) (-1.194) 
 
(0.206) (0.300) (0.220) (0.300)   (0.159) 
Swing -0.110 -0.138 -1.799 -3.288 -0.133 
 
-0.323** -0.363* -0.319** -0.363*   -0.303** 
 
(-0.747) (-0.946) (-0.481) (-0.906) (-0.957) 
 
(-2.213) (-2.007) (-2.176) (-2.007)  (-2.058) 
Switzerland -2.296 -3.288 -0.102 -0.138 -2.333 
   
   
 
(-0.631) (-0.906) (-0.671) (-0.946) (-0.679) 
   
   
IMF intervention 
  
  -10.88*** 
   
   -5.517 
   
  (-2.920) 
   
    (-1.067) 
   
   
   
   
Election timing * Misery | Cross-country 
relative misery 
 
   
   
   
 
      First post-crisis 
 
-3.904*  -14.74**  
  
-1.481  -7.410  
  
 
(-1.771)  (-2.409)  
  
(-0.316)  (-0.631)  
      Second post-crisis 
 
-4.933*  -18.19**  
  
3.348  7.154  
  
 
(-1.882)  (-2.339)  
  
(0.285)  (0.211)  
Constant -1.389 -0.570 12.62*** 3.776 -0.800 
 
-6.332* -5.582 2.239 1.243 -6.534* 
 
(-1.187) (-0.467) (4.128) (0.883) (-0.713) 
 
(-1.818) (-1.338) (0.331) 0.153 (-1.877) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 
 
37 37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.401 0.442 0.365 0.445 0.475   0.171 0.177 0.16 0.18 0.201 
t-statistics in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
  
          
  
          
  
 
 
Figure 1: Misery and PM support in WE and CEE  
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Table 2:  Political model: PM t+1 results as a function of time t votes and corruption  
 
 
  WE   CEE 
 
Variables M1 
 
M1 
M
ai
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
% Vote time t 0.735*** 
 
0.328 
 
(5.502) 
 
(1.224) 
Election timing. Ref (pre-crisis) 
         First post-crisis 2.134 
 
-8.926 
 
(0.266) 
 
(-0.483) 
      Second post-crisis 17.18 
 
-30.43** 
 
(1.510) 
 
(-2.093) 
Change in corruption  -0.112 
 
-6.789** 
 
(-0.0730) 
 
(-2.269) 
Swing -0.0836 
 
-0.131 
 
(-0.502) 
 
(-0.970) 
Coalition government 2.315 
 
3.062 
 
(0.983) 
 
(0.428) 
Switzerland -0.818 
  
 
(-0.208) 
       
Tw
o-
w
ay
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 Election timing*% Vote time t 
         First post-crisis -0.221 
 
0.187 
  (-0.981) 
 
(0.331) 
      Second post-crisis -0.705** 
 
0.709 
  (-2.087) 
 
(1.588) 
Constant 7.701* 
 
15.21* 
 
(1.786) 
 
(1.775) 
 Observations 69 
 
35 
 R-squared 0.573   0.472 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
   
 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Figure 2: PM vote at time t as a predictor of vote at time t+1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Volatility in pre and post-crisis periods.  
 
  West East 
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference 
Volatility (Total) 9.3 14.9 5.6*** 28.4 28.7 0.3 
Type-A 0.9 3.4 2.6*** 11.0 12.6 1.6 
Type-B 8.5 11.5 3.0** 17.4 14.8 -2.6 
Explained variance (R2) in Volatility 
(Total) by change in support of PM party 0.10 0.56 0.46
NA 0.35 0.51 0.16NA 
Misery -0.3 0.7 1.0*** -0.8 0.4        1.1*** 
Corruption  2.3 2.8 0.5 5.5 5.2 -0.3 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, NA not applicable  
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Figure 3: The determinants of volatility in WE and CEE  
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Table 4: The effects of misery, IMF intervention, and crisis for different parties (Y = % votes 
t+1 - % votes t) 
 
  
M1-Baseline M2-Misery M3-IMF M4-Misery and crisis 
M
ai
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Prime Minister -1.482** -1.438* -1.405* -1.287* 
 
(-1.974) (-1.953) (-1.879) (-1.743) 
Government  -3.619*** -3.504*** -3.657*** -3.633*** 
 
(-6.316) (-6.216) (-6.399) (-6.400) 
Misery 0.226 -0.990** 0.260 0.439 
 
(0.732) (-2.459) (0.842) (0.580) 
Crisis election -0.312 -0.341 -0.323 -0.571 
 
(-0.643) (-0.714) (-0.667) (-0.792) 
IMF intervention -1.142 -1.267 -4.216*** -1.286 
 
(-1.177) (-1.327) (-2.945) (-1.271) 
Party family: Ref. Mainstream 
    Non-Mainstream -1.608*** -1.721*** -1.923*** -2.323*** 
 
(-2.890) (-3.140) (-3.379) (-3.130) 
Radical Left -0.627 -0.755 -0.884 -1.348 
 
(-0.831) (-1.015) (-1.140) (-1.265) 
Populist radical right -0.425 -0.688 -0.777 -1.436 
 
(-0.515) (-0.825) (-0.922) (-1.249) 
New parties 5.032*** 4.243*** 4.308*** 2.736 
 
(4.515) (3.685) (3.462) (1.110) 
 
     
Tw
o-
w
ay
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 
Party family*Misery | IMF  
    Non-Mainstream 
 
1.899*** 4.734** -0.188 
  
(3.587) (2.514) (-0.162) 
Radical Left 
 
2.121*** 3.897 -0.385 
  
(2.811) (1.447) (-0.242) 
Populist radical right 
 
2.358** 6.291* -2.651 
  
(2.333) (1.775) (-0.822) 
New parties 
 
2.969*** 5.158* 4.064 
  
(3.302) (1.923) (0.790) 
Party family*Crisis  
    Non-Mainstream 
   
0.103 
    
(0.0937) 
Radical Left 
   
-0.315 
    
(-0.196) 
Populist radical right 
   
0.133 
    
(0.0763) 
New parties 
   
3.745 
    
(1.248) 
Crisis election*Misery 
   
-1.921** 
    
(-2.092) 
 
     
Th
re
e-
w
ay
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 Party family*Misery*Crisis  
   Non-Mainstream 
   
2.886** 
    
(2.104) 
Radical Left 
   
3.673* 
    
(1.938) 
Populist radical right 
   
6.047* 
    
(1.757) 
New parties 
   
-1.774 
    
(-0.337) 
 
Constant 1.906*** 1.927*** 2.103*** 2.406*** 
  
(3.842) (3.957) (4.221) (4.279) 
 
Observations 480 480 480 480 
 
R-squared 0.197 0.234 0.212 0.254 
 
t-statistics in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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      Figure 5: Misery and support of different parties in pre and post-crisis periods  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Additional tables  
 
Table A1: Factor analysis economic variables  
 
  Loadings 
Unemployment rate change  0.80 
GDP growth rate -0.82 
Debt change  0.87 
Note: Entries are the result of a principal-component 
factor analysis. 1 component extracted, eigenvalue 
2.06.  
 
 
Table A2: Pooled model. The impact of misery and timing of elections  
 
 
Variables M1 
M
ai
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Misery -1.422 
  (-0.575) 
Election timing. Ref (pre-crisis)        First post-crisis -0.920 
  (-0.322) 
      Second post-crisis -2.961 
  (-0.822) 
Coalition government -0.908 
  (-0.427) 
Swing -0.288*** 
  (-2.789) 
Switzerland -3.214 
  (-0.622) 
  East -5.611* 
 
  
Tw
o-
w
ay
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 
Election timing * Misery 
       First post-crisis -4.185 
 (-1.338)       Second post-crisis -5.165 
 (-1.385) Election timing * East 
       First post-crisis 1.028 
 (0.213)       Second post-crisis 1.069 
 (0.163) East * Misery -0.707 
 
  
Th
re
e-
w
ay
 in
t. Election timing * Misery*East        First post-crisis 2.840 
 (0.631)       Second post-crisis 5.480 
 (0.642) 
 
Constant -0.335 
  
(-0.204) 
 
Observations 106 
 
R-squared 0.355 
 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table A3: Pooled model:  Political model  
 
 
Variables M1 
M
ai
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
% Vote time t 0.738*** 
 (4.949) Election timing. Ref (pre-crisis)        First post-crisis 2.250 
 (0.238)       Second post-crisis 17.46 
 (1.311) Corruption change -0.173 
 (-0.0967) Coalition government 2.418 
 (0.980) Swing -0.120 
 (-1.320) Switzerland -0.801 
 (-0.173) 
  East 7.513 
 
 
(0.941) 
 
  
Tw
o-
w
ay
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 
Election timing * % Vote time t 
       First post-crisis -0.225 
 (-0.850)       Second post-crisis -0.713* 
 (-1.808) Election timing * East 
       First post-crisis -11.27 
 (-0.665)       Second post-crisis -48.21*** 
  (-2.797) 
% Vote time t * East -0.409* 
 (-1.742) East * Corruption change -6.553** 
 
 
(-2.291) 
Th
re
e-
w
ay
 in
t. Election timing * % Vote time t * East        First post-crisis 0.412 
 (0.818)       Second post-crisis 1.435*** 
 (2.785) 
 
Constant 7.661 
  
(1.545) 
 
Observations 104 
 
R-squared 0.582 
 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Volatility, misery and corruption.  
 
 
  Type B WE Type B CEE Type A WE Type A CEE Total volatility 
 
Variables M1 M1 M2 M2 M3 
M
ai
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Misery 2.906*** -0.920 1.368*** -0.150 4.297*** 
 (4.703) (-0.852) (2.660) (-0.0884) (3.869) Corruption change  -0.482 3.459* 1.166 2.754 0.691 
 (-0.452) (1.795) (1.312) (0.909) (0.360) Av. District magnitude 0.0364** -0.00578 0.00983 0.00890 0.0255 
 (2.110) (-0.247) (0.686) (0.242) (1.141) East     16.37*** 
     (8.650) 
       
Tw
o-
w
ay
 in
 
Misery * East 
    
-5.375*** 
     
(-2.900) 
Corruption * East 
    
5.536* 
     
(1.692) 
 Constant 8.795*** 16.65*** 1.426** 10.84*** 10.56*** 
  (13.34) (13.11) (2.601) (5.429) (9.330) 
 Observations 70 34 70 34 104 
 R-squared 0.294 0.100 0.123 0.031 0.488 
 
t-statistics in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
Table A5: Average marginal effects of misery on the change in votes between t and t+1 for 
different party families in pre and post-crisis periods (From model 4 table 4)  
 
Party type  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Mainstream 0.44 -1.48*** 
 
(0.58) (-2.87) 
Non-Mainstream 0.25 1.22** 
 
(0.29) (2.07) 
Radical Left 0.05 1.81* 
 
(0.04) (1.91) 
Populist radical right -2.21 1.92* 
 
(-0.71) (1.66) 
New parties 4.50 0.80 
  (0.88) (0.79) 
t-statistics in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B. Variables operationalization and summary statistics  
Variable Operationalization Mean / %  SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables            
Vote % of votes for a given party at a given election. Sources: NSD European 
Elections Database and Wolfram Nordsieck elections database 
12.52 11.92 0.00 58.63 
Vote difference 
Difference in % of votes for a given party between a given election and 
the previous one. Sources: NSD European Elections Database and 
Wolfram Nordsieck elections database 
0.00 7.12 -35.99 42.74 
Type A volatility  
Type A volatility is operationalized as follows:  |∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑜=1 + ∑ 𝑝𝑤(𝑜+1)|𝑛𝑤=12   , 
where o=old disappearing parties that contested only the election at time  t  
and w=new parties that contested only the election at time t +1, and p represents the percentage of votes received by each of those parties, at either t or t+1.  5.57 8.89 0.00 39.36 
Type B volatility Type B volatility is operationalized as: 
∑ | 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  −  𝑝𝑖 (𝑖+1) | 
2
  , where   i = 
pre-existing parties. 
11.90 6.50 0.50 31.73 
Total volatility  The total volatility for a given election is calculated by adding up type A and type B volatility, which is equivalent to the Pedersen index. 17.48 12.68 0.5 50.11 
Independent variables       
GDP growth rate  
Change in GDP (in percent) between election at time t+1 and election at 
time t. Source: Eurostat. Variable  nama_gdp_c with "Gross Domestic 
Product at market prices" unit selected 
23.98 24.49 -41.90 128.88 
Unemployment rate change Change in the unemployment rate (in percent) between election at time 
t+1 and election at time t. Source: Eurostat. Variable lfsq_urgan. 
0.37 3.82 -9.90 13.40 
Debt change 
Change in Government debt between election at time t+1 and election at 
time t. Source: Eurostat. Variable General government gross debt with % 
of GDP option selected.  
4.24 16.33 -42.30 79.50 
Misery 
Variable predicted from principal components factor analysis of GDP 
growth rate, Unemployment rate change, and Debt change (see appendix 
A) 
0.00 1.00 -2.66 3.56 
Cross-country relative misery  
Variable measuring the degree to which the change in misery in a given 
country deviates from the average change in WE and CEE in the pre or 
post-crisis periods. Before computing the variable the misery indicator in 
which this variable is based has been rescaled so that it only takes positive 
values. For example the cross-country relative misery for the first German 
elections in the post-crisis period has been calculated as follows:  
 
1 0.31 0 1.85 
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(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐺𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀 𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑝−𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑒𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑀𝑝𝐺)(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑊𝐸 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑝−𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝 ) . Hence, higher values indicate a  
 
relatively higher increase in misery  
IMF intervention Variable that takes the value 1 if a given country is under an SBA or EFF 
agreement with the IMF and 0 otherwise. Source: IMF database 
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Corruption  Change in corruption perception index between election at time t and 
election at time t+1. Source: Transparency International.  
0.03 0.58 -2.30 1.38 
Election timing (Categorical) 
 
    
      Pre-crisis t+1 election  took place before the Great-Recession 0.56    
      First post-crisis t+1 was the first election in a given country after the onset of the Great 
Recession 
0.28    
      Second post-crisis t+1 was the second election in a given country after the onset of the 
Great Recession 
0.16    
Crisis election Variable that takes the value 1 if the election at time t+1 took place during 
the Great Recession and 0 otherwise 
0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Av. District magnitude  Average district magnitude of electoral districts in each country. Source: 
Quality of Government Dataset.  
19.12 37.7 1 150 
Coalition government 
Variable that takes the value 1 if between the election at t+1 and t the 
government of a country was formed by a coalition. Source: Wolfram 
Nordsieck elections database 
0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Swing Parties gains or losses in the previous elections. Votes at time t - votes at 
time t-1. See Powell and Whitten 1993 p. 397 
6.03 11.11 -15.75 43.96 
Prime Minister Variable that takes the value 1 for the Prime Minister's party between 
elections t and t+1. (exception for Switzerland)      
Government Variable that takes the value 1 for those parties that were part of the 
cabinet between election and time t and t+1     
Party category (Categorical) See data and operationalization section and appendix C for details . Only 
for WE     
     Non-mainstream 
 
0.37    
     Mainstream 
 
0.39    
     Radical left 
 
0.10    
     Populist radical right 
 
0.08    
     New parties   0.06    
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APPENDIX C. Classification of parties in party categories (WE)  
 
Country Party/ies Name /s Party category Year founded 
Austria 
BZO Bündnis Zukunft Österreich Non-mainstream 2005 
FPO Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Populist radical right 1956 
Greens Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative Non-mainstream 1986 
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs Mainstream 1888 
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei Mainstream 1945 
FRANK Team Frank Stronach New 2012 
NEOS Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum New 2005 
Belgium 
CD&V / CDH Christian Democratic and Flemish / Humanist Democratic Centre Mainstream 1972 
ECOLO / GROEN ECOLO / GROEN Non-mainstream 1981 
MR / VLD Reform Movement / Open VLD  Mainstream 1972 
PS / SPA  Socialist Party / Socialist Party Different Mainstream 1978 
PTB-PVDA Worker's party of Belgium  Radical left 1979 
N-VA / VB / LDD Flemish interest /New Flemish Alliance / Libertarian, Direct, Democratic Populist radical right 2001/2004/2007 
Cyprus 
EVROKO European Party  Non-mainstream 1996 
EDEK Movement of Social Democrats Mainstream 1969 
AKEL Progressive Party of Working People  Radical left 1926 
DIKO Democratic Party Mainstream 1976 
DISY Democratic Rally Mainstream 1976 
EDI United Democrats Non-mainstream 1993 
NEO New Horizons Non-mainstream 2001 
 
 
 
Denmark 
KF  Conservative People's Party Mainstream 1915 
DF  Danish People's Party Populist radical right 1995 
LA  Liberal Alliance New / Non-mainstream 2007 
V Denmark's Liberal Party Mainstream 1910 
EL  Unity List – The Red-Greens Radical left 1989 
RV Radical left Mainstream 1905 
S Social Democracy Mainstream 1871 
SF Socialist People's Party Radical left 1959 
 CIU Convergencia i Unió Non-mainstream 1978 
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Spain 
PP Partido Popular Mainstream 1989 
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español Mainstream 1879 
UPD Unión Progreso y Democracia New / Non-mainstream 2007 
IU Izquierda Unida Radical left 1986 
Finland 
KESK  Finnish Centre Mainstream 1908 
KOK National Coalition Party Mainstream 1918 
SFP Swedish People's Party in Finland Mainstream 1906 
PS  True Finns Populist radical right 1995 
KD Finnish Christian Democrats Mainstream 1958 
VIHR Green Alliance Non-mainstream 1987 
VAS Left Alliance Radical left 1990 
SDP Finnish Social Democratic Party Mainstream 1899 
France 
UDF / MoDem UDF / MoDem  Mainstream 1978 
UMP / NC  Union for a Popular Movement / New Centre Mainstream 2002 
EELV / Verts Europe Ecology The Green Non-mainstream 2010 
FN  National Front  Populist radical right 1972 
PS  Socialist Party Mainstream 1969 
PCF / FG French Communist Party / Left Front  Radical left 1921 / 2008 
PRG Radical Party of the left Non-mainstream 1972 
Germany 
Grüne Alliance 90 / The Greens Non-mainstream 1980 
CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union of Germany Mainstream 1945 
FDP Free Democratic Party Mainstream 1948 
PDS/ Linke Die Linke Radical left 2007 
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany Mainstream 1875 
 
 
Greece 
ANEL Independent Greeks New / Non-mainstream 2012 
ND  New Democracy Mainstream 1974 
DIMAR Democratic Left New / Non-mainstream 2010 
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement Mainstream 1981 
ChA Golden Dawn  Populist radical right 1993 
SYRIZA  Coalition of the Radical Left Radical left 2004 
KKE  Communist Party of Greece Radical left 1924 
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LAOS  Popular Orthodox Rally Populist radical right 2000 
Iceland 
BF  Citizens' Movement New / Radical left 2008 
BF Bright Future New 2012 
SSF  Independence Party Mainstream 1929 
VG Left-Green Movement Non-mainstream 1999 
XF Liberal Party Non-mainstream 2009 
P Pirate Party New 2012 
FSF Progressive Party Mainstream 1916 
S Alliance – Social Democratic Party of Iceland Mainstream 2000 / 1916 
Ireland 
FF Soldiers of Destiny Mainstream 1926 
FG  Family of the Irish Mainstream 1933 
GP Green Party Non-mainstream 1981 
LAB  Labour Party Mainstream 1912 
PD  Progressive Democrats Non-mainstream 1985 
SF We Ourselves Radical left 1905 
Italy 
Verdi Federation of Greens Non-mainstream 1990 
IdV Italy of Values Non-mainstream 1998 
PRC / PDCI Communist Refundation Party / Party of Italian Communists Radical left 1998 
LN  League North Populist radical right 1989 
M5S  Five Star Movement New  2009 
PD  Democratic Party Mainstream 2007 
PdL The People of Freedom Mainstream 2009 
SC  Civic Choice New 2012 
SEL  Left Ecology Freedom  New 2010 
UDC Unione di Centro  Non-mainstream 2002 
Luxembourg 
CSV Christian Social People's Party Mainstream 1944 
GRËNG The Greens Non-mainstream 1983 
DP Democratic Party Mainstream 1955 
ADR Alternative Democratic Reform Party Non-mainstream 1987 
LENK The Left New / Radical left 1999 
LSAP Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party Mainstream 1902 
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Malta 
PL Labour Party Mainstream 1921 
PN Nationalist Party Mainstream 1926 
Norway 
SV Socialist Left Party Radical left 1975 
AP Labour Party Mainstream 1887 
SP Centre Party Mainstream 1920 
KRF Christian People's Party Mainstream 1933 
H Right Mainstream 1884 
V Left Mainstream 1926 
FRP Progress Party Populist radical right 1973 
MDG Environment Party Non-mainstream  1988 
Netherlands 
SP  Socialist Party Radical left 1972 
GL Green Left Non-mainstream 1991 
PvdA  Labour Party Mainstream 1946 
D66 Democrats 66 Non-mainstream 1966 
CDA Christian Democratic Appeal  Mainstream 1980 
VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy Mainstream 1948 
CU Christian Union Non-mainstream 2001 
LPF   Lista Pim Fortuyn Populist radical right 2002 
PVV Freedom Party New / Populist radical right 2004 
Portugal  
BE Left Bloc Radical left 1999 
PCP/PEV Portuguese Communist Party / Ecological Party The Greens Non-mainstream 1921 / 1982 
PS Socialist Party Mainstream  1973 
CDS-PP People's Party Non-mainstream 1974 
PSD Social Democratic Party Mainstream 1974 
Sweden 
V Left Party Radical left 1917 
MP Environment Party The Greens Non-mainstream 1981 
S Social Democratic Workers' Party Mainstream 1889 
C Centre Party Mainstream 1913 
KD  Christian Democrats Mainstream 1964 
M Moderate Coalition Party Mainstream 1904 
FP Liberal People's Party Mainstream 1934 
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SD Sweden Democrats Populist radical right 1988 
Switzerland 
GPS  Green Party of Switzerland Non-mainstream 1986 
SP  Social Democratic Party of Switzerland Mainstream 1888 
GLP Green Liberal Party Switzerland New 2007 
CVP + CSP Christian Democratic People's Party Mainstream 1912 
BDP Civic Democratic Party Switzerland New 2008 
FDP The Liberals / Liberal Party of Switzerland Mainstream 2009 / 1913 
SVP Swiss People's Party Populist radical right 1971 
UK 
LAB Labour Mainstream 1906 
CON Conservative and Unionist Party Mainstream 1832 
LD Liberal Democrats  Non-mainstream 1988 
 
 
